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ABSTRACT 
The literature on knowledge transfer is confident in its assertion that a ‘stickiness’ 
pervades knowledge disclosure process. This phenomenon is often attributed to 
structural communication barriers but an equally valid explanation could stem from 
the individual feeling a sense of ownership of their knowledge which then engenders a 
reluctance to be open about their knowledge within a formal knowledge transfer 
process.  We pursue this idea theoretically through notions of possessiveness and 
psychological ownership; and empirically by exploring the concept of willingness to 
disclose.  Assuming willingness to be unidimensional a methodology is put forward 
that uses indicators to measures its direction. Using a sample of 1050 UK engineers 
we illustrate the direction of willingness on a reluctance- willing dimension.  We 
argue that knowledge transfer requires management to examine more closely the 
stimuli that affect the process.   
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This paper describes an exploratory study of the willingness of individuals to disclose 
and exchange knowledge in the knowledge transfer process. There has been a 
tendency within the literature to take a number of individual level factors for granted 
(for example, willingness) by appearing to assume that knowledge transfer is 
automatic once procedures are in place and structural and communication 
impediments have been overcome.  We argue that this is not the case because once the 
individual is placed at the centre of the knowledge transfer process the assumption 
becomes unrealistic. We acknowledge that willingness is a malleable entity that can 
be influenced and therefore accept that social and political aspects of any exchange 
situation may influence the willingness of individual. However, we make a case for an 
intrinsic form of influence and suggest that irrespective of social pressure, the 
individual will express a natural reticence or reluctance to simply disclose or 
exchange their knowledge even in accommodating collaborative frameworks 
(Huxham & Vangen 2001).  This rationale is supported by the ‘stickiness’ observed in 
the knowledge management literature in which knowledge is reluctant to flow 
between workers (Szulanski 1996).   Whilst such stickiness is often attributed to 
structural communication difficulties, one equally plausible explanation could be that 
it emanates from a personal reluctance to divulge, stemming from a sense of 
psychologically ownership of knowledge (Dirks, Cummings & Pierce 1996). This is 
the theoretical stance taken in this paper. 
 Our emphasis, following the line of Lam (2000), acknowledges different types of 
knowledge and the fact that they can be held individually and collectively.  However, 
notwithstanding the type of knowledge and allowing for the degree of awareness of 
that knowledge, we argue that disclosing or exchanging such knowledge is not an 
automatic process. We draw a distinction between willingness to collaborate and 
actually being prepared to divulge knowledge on the grounds that even in 
collaborative frameworks the individual’s propensity still matters.  
Szulanski’s (1996) notion of ‘internal stickiness’ is a useful starting point 
because of his concern for barriers to knowledge transfer.  We note that he 
emphasises ambiguity and comprehension as communication uncertainties but also 
that he attributes little influence to personal motivation.  We concur with Szulanski in 
that the process of knowledge transfer is not automatic, but, we go further to argue 
that psychological ownership of knowledge has an intervening role in the individual’s 
willingness to disclose knowledge; this is the basic premise which drives the 
theoretical and conceptual arguments in this paper. We examine psychological 
ownership from an individualistic perspective through the literature that explores 
feelings of possessiveness, the sense of ‘mine’, and make a connection between the 
feelings of possessiveness and willingness to disclose knowledge. The arguments 
fully recognise the legal and organisational rights within knowledge transfer processes 
but emphasis that there is a human element within those processes.  The theoretical 
analysis which follows begins by examining the nature of willingness then draws in 
the notion of possessiveness and makes a case that knowledge can be possessed. At 
this juncture the arguments are introduced to the context of knowledge transfer 
process. A central issue here is the difference between collaborative tendencies 
(willingness to participate) and willingness to disclose and transfer knowledge.  The 
empirical study described is an attempt to find a way of measuring individuals’ 
willingness. It is based on a sample of UK engineers on the grounds that they 
represent a diverse skill set within a common nomenclature that have high levels of 
human capital and are regularly involved in knowledge transfer processes. 
 
WILLINGNESS AND KNOWLEDGE    
The literature on willingness is normally context specific in that it is attached to an 
action (willingness to pay; willingness to accept).  However, when confined to the 
concept of willingness itself, the literature is limited and has a problem with its 
definition because it is often taken for granted.  In its simplest form willingness can be 
conceived as a freedom from reluctance (Kahn 1990; May, Gilson & Harter 2004).  
Yet, it is not uncommon for the concept simply to be subsumed within the 
attitude/behaviour prediction relationship as intentionality (see for example: Aryee, 
Chay & Chew 1996; Gallucci & Perugini 2003; Landau, Shamir & Arthur 1992; 
Morgan, Miller & Arasaratnam 2003; Stilwell, Liden, Parsons & Deconinck 1998).  
We take the position that the measurement of intention, which normally is captured 
through being directed at an object (as in market research), does not represent or 
capture the broader concept of willingness.  Putting aside the limitations of 
definitions, there are three aspects of willingness that relate to our interest in the 
stickiness found in knowledge transfer: firstly, the effect of social identification on 
collective action in which the individual first decides to participate in a group activity; 
an act which pre-ordains a degree of disclosure of knowledge. Secondly, there is the 
issue of reciprocity and exchange. Thirdly, there is the social and political pressure 
which others can exert on the individual’s willingness which can both lower the 
propensity to disclose knowledge and cause the individual to question the legitimacy 
of the knowledge itself (Walsh, Henderson & Deighton 1988). 
 The willingness of an individual to engage in collective action or in a 
collaborative framework is seen as a measure of their identification with that group 
(Fosh 1993; Kelly & Kelly 1994). We argue that such identification is a facilitative 
environment that might induce knowledge exchange but it does not guarantee it.  The 
stickiness arguments are largely founded on conditions within the organisation that 
militate against collaboration such as, high ‘power distance’ (Guzman & Wilson 
2005) and uneven power distribution (Darrah 1996).   Coopey and Burgoyne (2000) 
argue that a particular political climate would facilitate learning and cooperation but 
do not touch directly on individual motives with the arguments remaining in the social 
domain. Goh (2002) is more specific in arguing that motives are part of the 
framework by which management integrate knowledge. Molm (1994) raises the case 
of interdependence and suggests that a structure of reciprocal dependence is a 
defining characteristic of all social relations based on exchange; we see this only as a 
starting point.   Gallucci and Perugini (2003) put the structural arguments to one side 
in emphasizing that reciprocity between individuals is a valence based relationship; 
something of value has to be exchangeable. They go further to argue that reciprocity 
is a ‘natural tendency’ which they term ‘propensity to reciprocity’, in other words, the 
tendency is a personality variable. We make no such claims in our empirical study but 
take on board the possible influence of receiving knowledge as an incentive to 
exchange.   
 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE NOTION OF POSSESSIVENESS 
The argument that knowledge can be possessed is in one sense obvious in that tacit 
knowledge can be embedded within practice but our arguments refer to knowledge 
which is conscious and available to awareness.  It is this knowledge that has the 
capacity to be favoured and valued.  By taking this position we do not imply that only 
knowledge that is conscious and valued is relevant to knowledge transfer. Some 
knowledge is not communicable and some only exchangeable by face to face practical 
working (Von Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka 2000; Birkinshaw, Nobel & Ridderstrale 
2002).  Reber (1993), following the line of  Polanyi (1964),  points out that tacit 
knowledge is often unconscious knowledge because it is contained within practice 
and is therefore only communicable indirectly through demonstration (e.g. riding a 
bicycle). Similarly, organisational cognition would argue that tacit knowledge is 
contained within activity systems (work systems and routines) that represents a 
collective mind in that the system itself only works because of a shared 
interdependence of knowledge between group members made explicit only through 
interaction (Weick & Roberts 1993).  
 Concerns about the type of knowledge and its location are important but, for 
any knowledge to be regarded as a possession, it has to have two properties attached 
to it by its owner, namely, that they are favoured and that they represent the individual 
in terms of their self identity.   Leading logically from this position is the question as 
of if knowledge can be psychologically possessed, then can it play a part in an 
individuals’ willingness to disclose their knowledge.  
Possessiveness is about psychological ownership which involves the     
valuation of something in terms of the self.   Furby (1991) refers to it as the 
‘psychology of mine’.  Possessions not only give a sense of control (Rudmin 1993: 
55) but also a feeling of continuity and security (Steiner 1978; Pierce, Kostova & 
Dirks 2003).  These feelings transmit themselves into behaviour which can be 
constructive but also dysfunctional with effects such as failing to give away 
information (Burke & Reitzes 1991).  However, we argue that it is the tendency to 
favour what is felt to be possessed that has influence on the willingness to disclose 
and exchange knowledge (Nuttin 1987; Formanek 1991; Beggan 1992).   This would 
be especially strong when an individual had created new knowledge. It would be 
surprising if they did not feel a sense of attachment to it (Newell, Robertson, 
Scarborough & Swan 2002).  Notwithstanding the above arguments, the question as to 
whether knowledge can be seen as a possession in the same way as a physical object 
is an unresolved issue. In this respect we highlight the arguments of Bernstein (2000) 
who argued that knowledge can be internalised.  For Bernstein, knowledge was an 
outer expression of an inner relationship.  The inner relationship was a guarantee of 
the legitimacy, integrity, worthwhileness and value of the knowledge. Our assumption 
is that to be internalised the knowledge has, in some way, to be valued and that if 
valued it can be regarded as a psychological possession which forms an inner 
meaning to one self.  One possible value that can be placed on knowledge is that of 
utility, that is, valued for its usefulness.  The concept of usefulness grants to 
knowledge an instrumental purpose; something has to be achieved.  The achievement 
can be an action or a thought or both but in either case the knowledge has a value.  It 
can be a practical goal or, the exploration of some theoretical or, even an abstract 
concept (Scribner 1986).  Usefulness as a value relates to a possession’s role in 
providing necessary functions such as status and identity (Prentice 1987).  We suggest 
that if knowledge is to be considered as a possession then it must be, in some way and 
for some purpose, be valued. 
 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER  
There is no shortage of literature on best practice, transfer models and strategies for 
the process of knowledge transfer (Parsons 2004; Sammons 2005; Svensson 2000).  
Furthermore, the model of Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination, and 
Internalisation (SECI) (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995) is well recognised and influential 
in the managerial literature (e.g. Sullivan & Nonaka 1986; Magnus & Morgan 1999; 
Baumard 1999; Von Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka 2000; Wang, Tong & Koh 2003). The 
model contains a dynamic process in which explicit and tacit knowledge are 
exchanged and transformed.  The fact that knowledge transfer is at the heart of 
technological and therefore economic, progress is not in doubt (Dayasindhu 2002; 
Osterloh and Frey 2000).  Nor is there any question that such exchange requires 
mechanisms that have structure.  The literature shows that such structures, both legal 
and organisational, exist and are, to varying extents, effective. However, it is also 
clear that structures themselves depend on the cooperation of the people involved 
(Mills, Hall, Leidecker & Margulies 1983; Morris & Empson 1998; Watson & Hewett 
2006).  Cooperation itself is a process that does not imply agreement but does, 
indirectly, suggest that willingness is part of the dynamics of that process. Our 
arguments extend this line of thinking.  
This requires an individualistic perspective which is, to an extent, neglected in 
the literature (See Johnson-Laird 1983; Zander 1991; Garavelli, Gorgoglione & 
Scozzi, 2002 for exceptions that touch on the psychology of knowledge transfer).  The 
managerial literature, for example, explicitly discusses how to deal with the transfer 
of knowledge as if it were an automatic process (Badaracco 1991; O’Dell & Grayson 
1998).  In a sense, this propensity is understandable because knowledge transfer is 
imbued with ownership issues which have strong legal and organizational 
connotations attached. Who owns the knowledge to be transferred is open for 
interpretation.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Development of the willingness indicators 
The problem with measuring willingness is that the literature makes no strong 
assumption about whether the concept is holistic or one which contains components. 
In other words, research is left with having to assume unidimensionality because it is 
not certain of the existence of, and the identity of, possible components of a multi-
dimensional construct.  In these circumstances a method is needed which describes 
the concept without assuming to define it.   Furthermore, the fact that willingness and 
willpower are common figures of speech only serves to indicate that willingness is not 
a fixed quantity but a pliable property that can be influenced.  This adds to the 
complexity of the task for methodology but also gives a clue as to how it can be 
measured.  The fact that it can be influenced by stimuli that trigger motives suggest 
that measuring for the effect of these influences is a way of indicating the existence of 
the phenomenon of willingness. This is the approach taken in this study.   
Parallels with other psychological entities are not easy to establish. At one 
level the problems of measurement can be seen as similar to those of ‘satisfaction 
measurement’ in that there are no indications of absolute level of magnitude. There is 
the issue of negative and positive values and the question of whether the concept can 
be considered continuous or discontinuous. Can unwillingness be assumed to be the 
contrasting pole to willingness?  Satisfaction measurement is focussed on an object 
(noun) and can be measured both holistically and through components using 
probability assumptions which can be verified through internal consistency measures. 
This is not possible in the case of willingness as we simply do not know the nature of 
any components it might have, as discussed previously in the literature review.  
In this study we  assume that ‘in action’ there is such an entity as ‘willingness’ 
but that it can not be measured directly but can be inferred by indicators that influence 
it. Therefore we opted for a different approach based on the property of direction and 
we developed indicators of influence based on an assumption of a continuum running 
from mild positive inclination to strong positive inclination.  We are not assuming a 
negative pole because there is empirical evidence to suggest that reluctance is the 
opposite of willingness. The devised indicators are not attributes of the entity but 
merely indicators of the direction it is pointing.  We measure the distance between the 
indicators as a way of establishing a pattern and it is the direction of the pattern that is 
important not the actual standardised distances between the indicators.     Direction is 
the important concept here but magnitude may be inferred by the clustering of 
indicators in one direction or the other.  
The development process which produced eight willingness indicators was 
conducted through a focus group of academic engineers from a UK university 
(N=10).  The focus group was asked to discuss knowledge exchange between 
academics and between universities and industry in terms of the individual engineer 
involved in the process. The discussion was empowered to look, on the one hand, at 
the structural issues involved in the process; in this respect the group worked through 
their personal experiences of institutional issues. On the other hand, the discussion 
was encourages to explore knowledge in terms of individual need (Isabella 1990) 
particularly the way it functions in facilitating collaboration, enabling performance, 
granting status and having intrinsic value that enhances self-worth. Again the 
discussion resolved around personal experiences in dealing with research teams, 
colleagues and the media. The indicators emerged from the discussion and the 
facilitator constantly asked the group for consensus on each indicator. There was a 
consensus reached on eight indicators of willingness; which were;  
1.   If there were no competition 
      2.   If I could trust my colleagues 
3.   If I had legal guarantees and permissions 
      4.   If I had a financial incentive 
5.   If it would enhance my professional standing 
6.   If it would make me well known 
7.    If  I would receive new knowledge in exchange 
8.    If I were fairly treated by my employer 
 
They represent structural (1.3.4) communication (7) and personal (2,5,6,8) influences 
at an individual level.  
 
Sampling strategy and structure 
The study was conducted on qualified engineers that is, on engineers who had attained 
academic certification by a chartered professional association.  The selection of 
engineers was based on the assumption of high levels of human capital and a strong 
likelihood of involvement in knowledge transfer processes. With the cooperation of 
six major professional associations within the UK an on-line survey was conducted 
and a total of 2242 engineers responded. The survey produced 1050 responses (47% 
response rate) from professional engineers working in the UK; this forms the overall 
sample for analysis (N=1050).  The sample was inclusive of the following 
engineering specialisations: chemical (N = 127), civil (N = 93), computer (N = 54), 
electronic (N = 166), mechanical (N = 103), process (N = 33), scientific (N = 78) and 
structural engineers (N = 349). A number of engineers who completed the survey did 
not identify their engineering category (N = 47).  
 
The application of the indicators 
In order to give the measurement the essential property of direction the indicators 
were measured on a 7 point scale along the construct ‘most positive willingness to 
disclose knowledge - Least positive willingness to disclose knowledge’. We make no 
assumption about the polar dimensions of willingness and thus the scale is couched in 
positive terms and thus implies that reluctance is a diminished amount of positive 
feeling rather than a negative feeling. The conditions of the study meant that there 
was an assumption of unidimensionality but no assumption of equal intervals in the 
scaling.  The problem therefore was to find a method of standardisation which could 
meet these conditions. The study takes an ordered category approach using Green’s 
successive category method to standardise the distance scale (Dunn-Rankin 1983), 
this method uses accumulated proportions to create standardised category boundaries 
whilst giving each indicator an equal chance of influencing willingness.  The 
judgements of the sample on each indicator are assumed to be normally distributed.  
The data processing is in three phases; the production of a set of cumulative 
probabilities; the creation of category boundaries and then the allocation of average 
indicator score to the boundary set.  Firstly, the raw scores are translated into a 
cumulative distribution. This is converted into a cumulative frequency distributed 
which is then turned into a set of cumulative probabilities. The probabilities are then 
converted into z scores. Table 1 displays the cumulative proportions as z scores. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 The second phase is to create boundaries. These are calculated by subtracting 
each column score (2-1, 3-2 …7-6; example 2-1 on indicator 1 is -1.03 – 0.70 = 0.33) 
and the average difference between the column is then accumulated to form the 
boundary between the categories. Table 2 displays the differences between the 
categories 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
 
 
Assuming the first boundary as equal to zero, to obtain the category boundaries 
(B) the mean score for each boundary is summed as follows; 
B1= 0 
B2= 0; 33:                         0.33 
B3= 0; 33; 21:                   0.54 
B4= 0; 33; 21; 47;             1.01 
B5= 0; 33; 21; 47; 43;       1.46 
B6+ 0; 33; 21; 47; 43; 71; 2.15           
 
The scale range runs from 0.33 to 2.15. The last column in Table 2 shows the 
boundary distance if equal intervals had been a legitimate assumption (0.43). 
 The final stage is to obtain the scale scores. This is done by subtracting the z 
score for each indicator from each boundary score then averaging it.  This gives an 
average distance score for each indicator when placed against this standardised scale. 
In other words, the output is a rank order which places each indicator against a set of 
category boundaries founded on a standardised distance continuum.  Table 3 shows 
the boundaries minus the z scores from table 1 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 The column on the right indicates the score the sample registered for each of the 
eight indicators. 
The main rationale for using Green’s successive categories approach is that the 
study is measuring willingness indirectly and assuming the willingness statements are 
discrete conditions or influences but not attributes. As discrete conditions they will 
have a differential influence and this is represented by the distance between them.   
Figure 1 illustrates the estimated distance of the eight indicator statements placed 
within the overall sample.  Each interval score is a representation of the estimated 
distance of the statement from both poles.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 Figure 1 shows the direction of the indicators is towards the stronger positive pole 
but not emphatically so.  This clustering may be due to sample variation but may also 
represent the abstract nature of the questions asked because there was no identified 
objective piece of knowledge for the sample to focus their possessiveness upon.  
Interpretation involves judging the rank order and the placing of the items in respect 
of the higher pole. In detail, the results for the overall sample show that the indicator 3 
(interval score = 1.42) ‘if I had legal guarantees and permissions’ and indicator 7 
(interval score = 1.38) ‘if I would receive new knowledge in exchange’ exert the most 
positive influence on willingness toward disclose knowledge.  The predominance of 
these indicators may be due to the sense in which they capture the fundamental ideas 
of propriety and reciprocity which emanate from the literature.  By contrast indicator 
6 ‘if it would make me well known’ is an indicator of the least positive willingness 
towards disclosure of knowledge; which suggests knowledge ownership is linked to a 
sense of self and through that, possibly to a sense of privacy.  The original focus 
group created this indicator through being able to give examples of engineers who 
used their knowledge to promote themselves; this aspect was recognized but not 
approved of.   The interval scores revealed a clear distance between wanting 
knowledge in exchange and needing a financial incentive.  Whether differences in the 
positioning of these indicators represent a kind of architecture of stickiness is worth 
speculation but is doubtful. What is clear is that these indicators/conditions can be 
differentiated by the sample and as such the differentiation can be interpreted in terms 
of motives that lie behind the pattern.  
The indicators have two properties that make them useful to the interpretation of 
knowledge transfer exchanges; firstly that they are directional without being value 
specific. They can however, be interpreted in terms of positive and negative 
depending on circumstances. Secondly, they are individual measures taken externally 
from any context.  The significance of indicators of this type to the knowledge 
transfer process is, that as they are external to any particular knowledge transfer, they 
can be used to interpret the levels of exchange enacted.  Many studies of knowledge 
transfer fall into two categories; those that infer the need for willingness but do not 
actually measure it (Watson & Hewett 2006; Singh & Premarajan 2007) and those 
that simply assume it to be there.  Even tacit knowledge requires willingness when 
formally channelled. For example, in describing practical methods of disseminating 
tacit knowledge Smith, McKeen, and Singh (2007) fail to acknowledge that the 
various practices they propose still require a willingness to share.  Studies from an 
organisational perspective often argue a case for trust and culture as the basis of 
exchange. In this type of  study willingness is seen as not only a necessity for 
achieving knowledge transfer goals but as a bedrock of trust itself; yet it is inferred 
rather measured directly (Zhikun, Fungfai & Qiying 2007).  Very detailed studies 
such as that of Carlisle (2002) on knowledge boundaries raise the issue that 
willingness is part of a wider and complex process and not in itself sufficient to 
ensure successful cooperative output.  Willingness is part of the process but is not 
solely derived from interaction within that process.  It is for this reason we argue that, 
if we are to understand and interpret levels and forms of disclosure and exchange in 
particular circumstances then we need to know what the individuals bring to the 
situation.  This argument is supported by the theoretical discussion on possessiveness 
and identity. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the study has been to bring the human element to the forefront of 
knowledge transfer: to recognise that individual biases matter.  We argue that, 
notwithstanding the ambiguity and complexity of a collaborative framework, such as 
that described by Huxham and Vangen (2001), the personal willingness to disclose 
and exchange knowledge is a discrete area of concern to research in this field.   Our 
arguments that propagate the individual as the locus of knowledge are contestable 
(Felin & Hesterly 2007).  For example, Cook and Brown (1999) argue that the 
individual locus of knowledge has been too influential and is dangerous to an 
integrated approach. This argument is itself contested by Van de Ven and Johnson 
(2006) who, in the context of knowledge transfer point out the role of individual 
differences and gaps in knowledge are sources of new knowledge creation.  In 
asserting the primacy of the individual we are not denying the social constructivist 
argument that knowledge is a social phenomenon that is different from the 
aggregation of individuals (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998:246).  Nor do we dispute the 
collectivist view that knowledge can be held within a group (Halbwach 1992).  We 
are however arguing that, notwithstanding the nature and source of knowledge, the 
individual can be aware of it, use it and have feelings towards it; one of which may be 
possessiveness. 
 The empirical study has shown a differential influence of indicators which can be 
interpreted in terms of motives and as potential barriers to knowledge transfer.  The 
nature of these indicators is that of a predicted environmental response to the 
contemplated act of knowledge transference. In this sense they have the character of 
motivational stimulus-response but in this case the response is anticipated not enacted.  
If I disclose my knowledge I may get a particular response, for example, an 
enhancement of my personal standing within a group or a substantive financial 
reward.  By contrast the absence of positive environmental signals may lead to the 
anticipation of no response in which case, the indicators may be a barrier to 
knowledge transfer.  Either way the individual’s response will be moderated by the 
level of valence attached to the indicators, for example, the absence of financial 
reward for an individual who attached a high valence to that stimulus may create 
reluctance. Similarly, an individual may not wish to be well known even if the 
environmental situation would mean that knowledge disclosure would have that 
effect.  We accept the limitation of the study that there was no guarantee that subjects 
had actually taken part in formal knowledge transfer processes but argue that 
engineering roles are commonly conceived within collaborative frameworks. We also 
accept that the study does not resolve such issues as the polar nature of willingness or 
the question of magnitude but does address the direction of the phenomenon. 
 The particular indicators generated by the study require further research and 
refinement. They may not be representative in all circumstances and they are unlikely 
to be comprehensive. Research on identifying indicators that influence willingness in 
relation to knowledge transfer processes is, we believe, a worthwhile research agenda. 
Would the indicators change or appear in a different pattern through the influence of 
organisational contexts, technological specificity or by the nature of the transfer 
process itself? The theoretical underpinning of the study suggests that further research 
is necessary to connect the idea of knowledge as a possession or the sense of 
ownership of knowledge with, on the one hand, the indicators of willingness and on 
the other, with competing claims for the locus of ownership such as the organisation.  
This approach could be built around theories that connect professional identity or 
organisational identity to the salience of knowledge (Gao & Riley 2009).   Of 
particularly value would be research which identified the realm of motives that are 
salient to knowledge transfer.  This approach could be augmented further by studies 
based on theories from the psychological perspective that relate personal strategies 
and motives to employment (Rousseau 2005).  The study described here was not 
context specific but the methodological approach would be applicable to specific 
circumstances.  We argue that research on the individual within knowledge transfer 
processes is essential to understanding the dynamics of the process.   In 
methodological terms, our contribution is that we have demonstrated one approach to 
quantifying the concept of willingness.   
 It is perhaps unfair to suggest that management take the individual for granted in 
formal knowledge transfer processes but we contend that a focus on the individual’s 
motives in relation to their knowledge should be of primary concern in the 
management of these processes. Emphasis on creating the right environment is not, 
we suggest, sufficient to address the problem. 
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Figure 1. The estimated distance of the eight indicator statements 
                                   placed within the overall sample 
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 Table 1. Z scores of the cumulative probabilities 
 
indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 If there were 
no competition 
-1.03 -0.70 -0.49 -0.05 0.36 0.96 1.00 
2 If I could trust 
my colleagues 
-1.28 -0.91 -0.70 -0.22 0.13 0.88 1.00 
3 If I had legal 
guarantees and 
permissions 
-1.47 -1.08 -0.87 -0.38 0.03 0.68 1.00 
4 If I had a 
financial 
Incentive 
-0.91 -0.55 -0.33 -0.11 0.50 1.09 1.00 
5 If it would 
enhance my 
professional 
standing 
-1.17 -0.84 -0.61 -0.12 0.34 1.09 1.00 
6 If it would 
make me well 
known 
-0.87 -0.55 -0.30 0.21 0.74 1.41 1.00 
7 If I could 
receive new 
knowledge in 
exchange 
-1.28 -1.03 -0.84 -0.49 -0.02 0.81 1.00 
8 If I were fairly 
treated by my 
employer 
-1.08 -0.80 -0.64 -0.10 0.28 1.09 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.  The differences between the categories 
 
Indicators 2-1 3-2 4-3 5-4 6-5 
1 If there were no 
competition 
0.33 0.21 0.44 0.41 0.60 
2 If I could trust my 
colleagues 
0.37 0.21 0.48 0.35 0.75 
3 If I had legal guarantees 
and permissions 
0.39 0.21 0.49 0.41 0.65 
4 If I had a financial 
incentive 
0.36 0.22 0.44 0.39 0.59 
5 If it would enhance my 
professional standing 
0.33 0.23 0.49 0.46 0.75 
6 If it would make me 
well known 
0.32 0.25 0.51 0.53 0.67 
7 If I would receive new 
knowledge in exchange 
0.25 0.19 0.35 0.47 0.83 
8 If I were fairly treated 
by my employer 
0.28 0.16 0.54 0.38 0.81 
Sum 2.63 1.68 3.74 3.40 5.65 
N 8 8 8 8 8 
Mean 0.33 0.21 0.47 0.43 0.71 
Equal interval 
assumption 
0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3.  The boundaries minus the z scores from table 1 
 
indicators B1-z1 B2-z2 B3-z3 B4-z4 B5-z5 B6-z6 Mean 
1 If there were no 
competition 
1.03 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.18 1.07 
2 If I could trust my 
colleagues 
1.28 1.24 1.24 1.23 1.30 1.26 1.26 
3 If I had legal 
guarantees and 
permissions 
1.47 1.41 1.41 1.39 1.40 1.46 1.42 
4 If I had a 
financial incentive 
0.91 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.93 1.05 0.92 
5 If it would 
enhance my 
professional 
standing 
1.17 1.17 1.15 1.13 1.09 1.05 1.13 
6 If it would make 
me well known 
0.87 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.69 0.73 0.80 
7 If I would receive 
new knowledge in 
exchange 
1.28 1.36 1.38 1.50 1.45 1.33 1.38 
8 If I were fairly 
treated by my 
employer 
1.08 1.13 1.18 1.11 1.15 1.05 1.12 
 
